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United States of America’s hypocrisy towards India’s nuclear program

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India is not a state party to the NPT. It rejected the treaty publicly in May 1968 citing some of the following reasons; the NPT had failed to address the problem of existing proliferation. India was mainly against the NPT’s decision to give the NWS a legal right to possess nuclear weapons¹⁵. Similar sentiments have been expressed by authors like Frank Barnaby, Julie Dahlitz, Rebecca Johnson, and many others who question the logic behind the possession of nuclear weapons by a few states. This discrimination is clearly stated in Article I of the treaty which acknowledges the existence of NWS as well as Article IX which actually defines a NWS as one which manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear weapon device prior to January 1 1967¹⁶. The provisions of the treaty legitimize the possession of nuclear weapons by Russia, China, France, Britain and the United States.

India therefore rejected a treaty that gave special privileges to a few states, allowing them to possess nuclear weapons while disallowing others to do so. It believes that there must be real political commitment by the five established NWS to destroy their nuclear arsenals. Failure to do so means that NNWS which have the capability to make nuclear weapons should be allowed to do so. Instead of eliminating nuclear weapons or curbing nuclear proliferation, the NPT seems to have given India the zeal to develop its nuclear technology. India’s renewed perception of the utility of nuclear weapons is as a result of the discriminatory part of Articles I and IX of the treaty which accorded some states the right to possess nuclear weapons for their security, while disallowing others to do so. India also saw the NPT as having failed to provide for an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations between the NWS and the NNWS to cease weapon manufacture or proceed with specific measures of disarmament¹⁷.

China openly said it would continue to make nuclear weapons as to match up with other NWS. On the other hand Russia has not ceased nuclear weapon manufacture. The Bush and now Obama Administration’s nuclear weapons policy is the most obvious example. The United States has extended the range of nuclear deployment to include pre-emptive military strikes and is continuing to develop new nuclear weapons¹⁸. Though the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty signed between the Americans and Russians in 2010 and 2011 respectively seeks to reduce each country`s nuclear arsenals some of the weapons to be removed would simply go into storage thus negating the whole essence of nuclear disarmament. The situation becomes complicated when countries like North Korea and Iran are told to abandon their nuclear programs while the United States is busy stockpiling more and more weapons of mass destruction. Of particular concern to India was the failure of the treaty to constrain China’s proliferation. Rather it seemed to have accorded China special privilege to manufacture more weapons thus threatening India’s very existence.

Girilal Jain notes that as far back as 1967, India emphasized its problem of security against nuclear attack or nuclear blackmail as a result of the continuing threat posed by a nuclearized China in Asia. India had difficulties in accepting a treaty that failed to constrain Chinese nuclear weapon development as a well as giving China privileged status as a nuclear weapon power¹⁹. The issue of security has remained important in Indian strategic thinking. It has chosen the path of limited deterrence which entails a small but credible amount of nuclear weapons to deter an enemy²⁰. India has promised to continue embracing nuclear weapons to enhance national security. The established NWS also see their national security based on nuclear weapon possession. This Indian perception of national security is linked to the realist school of thought. The realists were instrumental in creating a specific understanding of nuclear deterrence and its diplomatic and military requirements. India’s nuclear programme reflects her desire to shape the world order through nuclear deterrence.

However despite India’s rejection of the treaty, recent developments in the international system have seen the Americans acting against the provisions of the NPT by engaging in talks with India over the lifting of nuclear sanctions. President George W Bush of the USA and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh of India concluded a deal that promised India-American Cooperation in civil nuclear energy despite India’s testing of nuclear weapons in 1995²¹.The Obama Administration has also promised India assistance with its civil nuclear program. Under this agreement India which has not signed the NPT would be given access to civilian technology in return for placing its atomic reactors under global safeguards²². This therefore implies that nuclear cooperation should be extended to India which has never signed the NPT and has no intention of doing so now.

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The United States’ attempt to incorporate India into global non-proliferation regime becomes very debatable because India possesses nuclear weapons and can only be allowed to join the NPT as a NNWS. The five nuclear powers recognized by the treaty are China, France, Britain, Russia and the USA. This is laid down in Article IX subsection 3 of the NPT that only those that count as NWS are those which exploded a nuclear device before January 1, 1967²³. The first nuclear explosions were by the United States over Hiroshima and Nagasaki in Japan on August 6 and 9 1945. Russia exploded her first test bomb in 1949, Britain in 1952. In 1960 came France and China in 1964. India exploded a nuclear device in 1974 and in May 1998 it conducted nuclear explosions²⁴. This therefore means that India cannot be part and parcel of the nuclear club, since according to the NPT, the only recognized NWS are those which exploded their nuclear weapons before January 1967.

It is therefore against such a background that the planned agreement between India and the US presents a heavy strain on the global NPT. So far, unlimited access to nuclear technology has only been open to NPT members. NNWS, at the same time, have to open up all their nuclear facilities to IAEA controls. India has not yet opened its nuclear facilities to IAEA inspections, a thing that Iran has done. India is therefore being given the rights that go with NPT membership without assuming the corresponding duties²⁵. Iran, which is a member to the treaty and has on several occasions allowed IAEA inspectors to its nuclear sites, is being denied access to nuclear technology which India, a non-party to the NPT is now enjoying. This privileging of India would be for other countries an incentive not to submit to the rules of the NPT. The irony of it all is that on the one hand the Americans refuse to provide Iran, a member of the NPT with nuclear technology to be used for peaceful purposes but at the same time from national interest motives they cooperate with India which stands outside the treaty.

From the above analysis, the following strategic implications can be the basis for the Indian-American nuclear deal. The Americans now confront the firm opposition of China, not as much as a direct threat to its security, but more as an obstacle to its interests in the Asian region. China’s fast growing economy and military might is a direct threat to American interests in the Asian region. China is America’s competitor for influence throughout Asia. The Americans want to encourage India’s weapons build up precisely to counter China’s growing arsenal. They want to use India to contain China’s geo-strategic ambitions in the region.

Secondly, Pakistan’s possession of nuclear weapons also remains a big problem to American military planners. At present, it is an American ally, but things can always change in the future, especially when an anti-American leader one day gets into office. Pakistan is therefore likely to stand out in the years ahead as the single most dangerous undeclared nuclear state in today’s world and India is the country that could if things got out of hand, be in a position to contribute to the stability of the region²⁶. India could be used to arm twist Pakistan in the event that a more radical regime takes over. Thirdly, India could be made to take an active part in restraining Iran from embarking on its nuclear program. In the event that war broke out between the Americans and Iran, India could be of strategic importance especially when launching attacks from bases closer to Iran. Lastly it is also in the interest of states to benefit from their relations with other states. India could be a lucrative market for America’s nuclear industry, which wants to get in ahead of Britain, France and Canada.

Despite the above strategic implications, there are also broader implications to this Indian-American nuclear deal. Bending the rules for India makes it harder for them to uphold them elsewhere. The biggest question would be why not also bending the same rules for Iran and North Korea. This intended lifting of nuclear sanctions for India actually provides Iranian hardliners with arguments they would otherwise have lacked previously for maintaining their nuclear course. The arbitrary distinction between acceptable and unacceptable nuclear programmes invalidates the search for universal and generally binding rules for the prevention of proliferation²⁷. America no longer regards the further proliferation of weapons as a problem but it now makes a distinction between good and bad proliferation. If India is to be admitted as a member of the treaty then this would immediately mean the collapse of the NPT since it goes against the much intended provisions of the treaty. How the international community will deal with the Indian-American nuclear deal will indeed decide the future of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation as a whole.

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